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To view this page ensure that Adobe Flash Player version 9.0.124 or greater is installed. Other examinations of the potential threat to nuclear facilities from aircraft have focused on perceived vulnerabilities of spent-fuel pools used to cool expended nuclear fuel. However, power companies maintain that a study modeling the impact 43 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Terrorist CBRN. 44 Staff Summary of Responses by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Correspondence from Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-MA), Member, Energy and Commerce Committee, U.S. House of Representatives. Security Gap: A Hard Look At the Soft Spots in Our Civilian Nuclear Reactor Security. March 25, 2002. of an aircraft crash into a spent-fuel pool wall concluded that while such a scenario could crush or crack the wall, it would not likely cause a release of radiation45. A report prepared for the AOPA by Robert Jefferson, a nuclear reactor safety consultant, concluded that the threat to nuclear reactors from small general aviation aircraft is “practically non-existent” and “...it is unlikely that a terrorist would choose a light general aviation vehicle to threaten a nuclear power plant.”46 Jefferson’s analysis concluded that even the impact of an airliner like those used in the 9/11 attacks would, in all likelihood, be unable to penetrate the outer containment vessel and argued that the analysis referenced by Representative Markey significantly overstates the risk potential and “...overlooks the fact that by their very design, nuclear power plants are inherently resistant to [airborne attacks].”47 The report also concluded that the proximity of nuclear reactors to GA airports does not increase the exposure of these facilities to terrorist threats. Although the specific threat posed to nuclear facilities by GA aircraft remains a contentious issue, the FAA has kept in force restrictions on circling, loitering, or otherwise flying in a suspicious manner around nuclear facilities. Arguably, these measures would provide little deterrent against a well-planned terrorist attack. However, they highlight the continued concern over possible airborne threats to nuclear facilities, whatever the true risk may be. More elaborate measures to protect nuclear facilities, such as implementing anti-aircraft defense capabilities around nuclear facilities, are wrought with operational and policy complexities including high costs, questionable effectiveness, and a potentially high risk of shooting down an errant GA pilot who meant no harm. 中国通航网 www.ga.cn 通航翻译 www.aviation.cn 本文链接地址：Securing General Aviation 通用航空安保(22) |
